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Abstract 
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I.   Introduction 
In 2009, the Euro celebrated its tenth anniversary. Champagne corks popped in Brussels 
and Frankfurt at self-congratulatory birthday parties, with the added bonus of the Euro as a 
safe umbrella against the turmoil in financial markets. Less than two years later, when the 
financial crisis of 2007-08 rapidly spilled over into a sovereign debt crisis on the continent 
and beyond, the single currency was facing an existential crisis. The combination of massive 
bank bail-outs, low growth, increased expenditure when the automatic stabilizers kicked in, 
and discretionary fiscal stimulus measures implied that the public purse would be heavily 
taxed in any case. In addition, some member states, from the always fiscally fragile Greece 
to the considerably more robust Italy and Spain (which had been running primary surpluses 
for most of the last decade), were threatened with exorbitant interest rates on government 
debt. Greece, Portugal, and Ireland called in the IMF and were forced to borrow from other 
EU governments in order  to remain functioning states. The diagnosis, both  in the press, 
among  politicians,  and  in  academic  circles,  was  unequivocal:  a  toothless  Stability  and 
Growth  Pact  invited  fiscal  profligacy,  while  labour  market  rigidities  prevented  adjustment. 
Less than two years after the world‘s tempestuous flirt with Keynesianism in response to the 
financial meltdown, it seemed, orthodox economic recipes had made a strong come-back.  
This paper looks elsewhere for answers: the problems of the single currency are directly 
related to the organization of labour relations in the member-states and their interaction with 
monetary policies. Somewhat schematically, continental (western) Europe consists of two 
very different systems of employment and labour relations, roughly coinciding with what Hall 
and  Soskice  (2001)  call  ‗coordinated  market  economies‘  (CME)  in  the  north-west  of  the 
continent (including Austria–geography is not the defining characteristic of this group or the 
others), and, for want of a better term, ‗Mixed Market Economies‘ in the south, in the form of 
the now infamous GI(I)PS, Greece, Italy, (Ireland), Portugal, and Spain (Hall & Soskice 2001; 
Hancké et al. 2007). The main difference between the two lies in the nature of the actors and 
the  configuration  of  institutions  and  rules  that  they  face.  In  CME,  strong  labour  unions 
encounter strong employers associations, particularly in the export sector; as a result, they 
negotiate wage settlements which simultaneously safeguard real wages and profitability; and 
that is done through negotiating wage rates between a floor set by inflation and a wage 
ceiling set by labour productivity. Strong systems of wage coordination then transmit these 
wage rates to the rest of the economy. In MME, the situation is different. First of all, the state 
regularly  has  to  step  in  to  compensate  for  the  lack  of  autonomous  bargaining  capacity 
among the key actors. Secondly, cross-industry wage coordination is considerably weaker 
than  in  the  north  of  Europe,  and  as  a  result  inter-sectoral  wage  drift  is  endemic. These 
differences  in  employment  relations  and  wage-setting  systems  implied  that,  against  the 
background of a relatively restrictive one-size-fits-all monetary policy in place since 1999, the 
north-west of the continent systematically improved its competitiveness, while the south lost 
competitiveness in parallel. Small differences between the two groups of countries at the 8 — Hancké / Worlds Apart? — I H S  
 
start  of  EMU  thus  were  accentuated  and,  against  the  background  of  low  growth  and  an 
almost closed economy (the virtual economy known as EMU trades less than 10% outside 
the EU), the northern CMEs accumulated current account surpluses while the GIIPS ran into 
severe balance of payments problems in 2010 and 2011 (Scharpf 2011). The sovereign debt 
crises of 2010-11, which threatened the survival of the Euro-zone itself in November and 
December 2011, simply reflected these structural imbalances: current account deficits are 
financed through debt, private and public. The problem with EMU, in other words, is one of 
current accounts, not fiscal deficits. 
This paper starts with a review of the debate on the political economy of EMU and the crisis 
that the single currency has faced in the last few years, and develops the argument above in 
contrast to the prevailing explanations. It then continues to its empirical point of gravity: in 
three sections the paper reconstructs the development of wage-setting systems against the 
background of monetary integration in Europe since the second oil shock–the emergence of 
the Deutschmark-bloc and its effects on wage-setting and labour relations, the Maastricht 
process, and the introduction of the Euro. The final section concludes by putting this analysis 
in the wider context of the debates on EMU. 
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II.   Understanding the crisis of EMU 
The crisis of EMU is an excellent place to take stock and analyse what makes EMU fragile: 
tensions  such  as  those  provoked  by  a  major  crisis  have  the  potential  to  bring  out  the 
problems with an institutional architecture that may be obfuscated by its operation under 
‗normal‘ circumstances. Four types of explanations have been offered for why EMU faces the 
problems  it  does.  The  first  is  an  old  stalwart  of  orthodox  economics:  labour  market 
regulation.  The  basic  idea  harks  back  to  theories  of  optimal  currency  areas.  If  all  other 
macro-economic adjustment mechanisms–monetary and fiscal policies as well as exchange 
rates–are more or less fixed, as they are in EMU, labour markets and therefore wages have 
to become more flexible. The lack of labour market flexibility in the south thus exacerbated 
the pre-existing problems in that region. This perspective certainly helps us understand part 
of  the  problem–although  with  an  ironic  twist,  as  I  will  argue  later  on.  One  observation, 
however,  should  give  pause  for  thought:  the  at  least  equally  inflexible  labour  markets  in 
countries  such  as  Germany,  Austria  and  the  Netherlands  have  not  produced  the  same 
adjustment problems. The highly organized (‗rigid‘) wage-setting systems in the north have, 
in fact, been at the basis of their strong economic performance in the shape of low inflation 
(and  relatively  low  unemployment)  and  of  their  micro-level  counterpart,  international 
competitiveness.  
The  other  orthodox  interpretation  of  the  crisis–and  the  purveyor  of  many  unpleasant 
newspaper headlines, especially in tabloids across the northern part of the continent during 
the crisis  years–was fiscal mismanagement, possibly supported by aloof capital  markets. 
During most of the Euro‘s first decade, interest rate differentials between Germany‘s baseline 
and  Greek  and  Italian  debt  were  negligible–at  least  as  much  a  reflection  of  the  lack  of 
credibility of the no bail-out clause in the Maastricht Treaty as of the massive incompetence 
of rating agencies who were supposed to report on the relative risk in government debt. 
Governments in the south thus were able to run up large public debt without paying a penalty 
in higher interest rates, which created the fiscal imbalances at the heart of the euro-crisis in 
2010 and after. While this explanation may help understand the Greek situation, it meets its 
limits when used to understand the problems of Ireland and especially Spain, two countries 
that, in fact, ran budget surpluses until the financial crisis of 2008. In addition, as Martin Wolf 
of the Financial Times has pointed out (6 December 2011), during the period between the 
start  of  EMU  in  1999  and  the  start  of  the  financial  crisis  in  late  2007,  only  Greece  ran, 
averaged  over  that  period,  a  public  deficit  considerably  beyond  the  three  per  cent  limit 
imposed by both Maastricht and the Stability and Growth Pact–hardly a persuasive indication 
of widespread fiscal irresponsibility.  
Spain and Ireland are, not surprisingly, at the basis of a third explanation, which revolves 
around asset price inflation and bursting bubbles. While headline consumer price inflation 
has hardly been problematic on the continent, both in the aggregate and in most individual 10 — Hancké / Worlds Apart? — I H S  
 
member-states, the ultra-low interest rates in some of the member-states stoked an asset 
boom:  low  interest  rates  begot  cheap  mortgages,  which  begot  massively  rising  housing 
prices and, on the back of that, a construction boom. This dynamic gets us closer to the 
problem, but it fails to understand outcomes in countries like Greece, Italy and Portugal, 
whose sovereign debt problems could hardly have been fuelled by asset price inflation since 
that was more or less absent in those countries.  
The  final  possible  explanation  was  poor  financial  regulation  and  a  host  of  dangerous 
mistakes on the back of that. Ireland is the case in point here: lax regulation attracted risky 
capital, which maximized profits in the implicit knowledge of a government bail-out if and 
when things were to go wrong. Financial developments in Ireland without doubt were not as 
well regulated as they could have been, and the decision in 2008 by then Prime Minister 
Brian Cowan to guarantee all bank debt will certainly go down as one of history‘s largest self-
inflicted policy mistakes. But the lack of financial acumen in Irish government circles hardly 
explains most of the other problematic cases. Regulation in Spain, for example, one of the 
only other countries with a sizeable, active and open banking sector, was never considered a 
problematic  aspect  of  the  new  Spanish  model.  And  most  other  countries  facing  fiscal 
problems in 2010 and 2011 had, in fact, relatively strict regulation or, as in Italy, a relatively 
closed banking sector.  
All four of these explanations help us understand pieces of the puzzle–but, at best, only 
pieces. One problem that they share is that they consider the problem to be very similar 
everywhere,  thus  implicitly  also  suggesting  that  the  problems  (and  the  solutions)  are 
primarily or even solely found at the national level. Labour market flexibility, fiscal rules, and 
better  regulation  remain  subject  to  national  policy-making,  helped  but  not  steered  by 
European  institutions.  This  assumption  is  probably  incorrect:  even  granting  the  arguable 
point that the problems were the same everywhere, the different organization of domestic 
economies  in  Europe  means  that  they  probably  do  not  have  the  same  effects  in  every 
country. More importantly, there are reasons to believe that the new international political 
economy associated with EMU is itself part of the problem: some of the dynamics underlying 
the Euro crisis, such as the massive current account divergences, almost perfectly coincide 
with the 1999 start of EMU. Combining these two insights–one loosely emanating from a 
‗Varieties of Capitalism‘ approach to comparative political economy, and the other inspired by 
New  Keynesian  macro-economics  (Carlin  &  Soskice  2006)–suggests  a  more  systemic 
explanation of the crisis.  
One key stylized fact that helps us understand the more structural dimension of the crisis of 
EMU is that since its inception in 1999, EMU has witnessed an increased divergence of 
inflation  and  wages,  as  well  as  of  economic  performance  more  generally  in  the  single 
currency area. In part this has been a relatively standard, more or less anticipated process of 
inter-country adjustment, especially since some countries, most notably Germany, entered 
EMU  with  an  overvalued  exchange  rate.  But  it  is  equally  a  consequence  of  Germany‘s I H S — Hancké / Worlds Apart? — 11 
reliance on exports for growth, which imposes a tight wage moderation strategy on its key 
industrial  sectors,  diligently  followed  by  unions,  both  in  the  export  and  in  the  sheltered 
sectors, including the public sector (note that the ‗wage moderation‘ referred to in this paper 
is, unless explicitly stated otherwise, expressed  in  unit labour costs–abbreviated  as ULC 
henceforth–which measure the ratio of wage rates over labour productivity rates). This neo-
mercantilist adjustment argument, again, helps us understand part of the problem: it explains 
why competitiveness rose in the north and fell in the south. But it probably attributes too 
much to a prevailing consensus among the key political-economic actors in Germany and 
particularly to their capacity to set relative wage rates. Leading trade unions in Germany, 
among them the IG Metall and ver.di have, in fact, campaigned for higher wages for most of 
the euro‘s existence, but failed to gain these. Explaining why these strong labour unions 
have been unable to set wages in their favour requires a more structural approach: in the 
EMU set-up, as I will show with a simple model below, there are strong systemic pressures 
that force a divergence of inflation and wage rates across the euro-zone (see Hancké & 
Soskice 2003 for a more formal elaboration of the basic idea).  
Imagine, for ease of exposition, that EMU consists of two economies of equal size, called DE 
(i.e. Germany with its north-west European neighbours, including Austria) and RE (for Rest 
of  Europe).  At  the  start  of  EMU,  DE‘s  inflation  rate  is,  because  of  its  more  strongly 
coordinated wage-setting system, slightly below RE‘s; they average two per cent, which is 
the ECB‘s inflation target. Since the ECB sets its interest rate for all members to reflect the 
difference between the target and the actual (i.e. the aggregate/average) inflation rate of DE 
and RE, the real interest rate (the nominal interest rate that the ECB sets for all minus the 
country-specific inflation rate) is therefore lower in the country with high inflation (RE) and 
higher in the low-inflation country (DE). These differences between real interest rates and 
domestic institutions have several consequences that are poorly understood. 
First of all, monetary policy is pro-cyclical. The country with higher inflation in effect has a 
more accommodating monetary policy than it should, because the bank‘s target is lower than 
its actual inflation rate. The country with a lower inflation rate, on the other hand, will have an 
unnecessarily restrictive monetary policy, which will not have a significant effect on price 
dynamics (since inflation is low already), but only on growth. Note that the opposite would 
happen if monetary policy were decided for each country individually (Allsopp 2002; 23 ff.): if 
inflation in DE were to fall, DE‘s central bank would almost certainly lower the nominal, and 
therefore in effect the real, interest rate; if inflation rises in RE, RE‘s monetary policy would 
tighten. None of that happens in EMU, where rising inflation is implicitly rewarded through a 
falling real interest rate. In part, of course, this pro-cyclical dynamic is compensated by a 
lower real exchange rate (RER) in the low-inflation countries, which improves competitive-
ness and therefore exports. However, two caveats are in order here: one, this compensatory 
effect  is  limited  to  the  export  sector,  which  makes  up  at  most  half  of  the  GDP  of  small 
economies  in  EMU  and  not  more  than  a  quarter  of  output  in  large  economies;  most 
importantly, perhaps, a RER depreciation in the low-inflation countries is at the root of their 12 — Hancké / Worlds Apart? — I H S  
 
stellar  competitiveness  performance,  and  thus  indirectly  at  the  basis  of  massive  current 
account deficits in countries with a higher RER. A depreciation of the RER in the low-inflation 
countries is part of the problem, in other words, not the solution. 
The second ill-understood effect is that the lower real interest rate that RE has faced during 
the first ten years of EMU feeds into a path of higher growth in RE, fuelling (wage) inflation. 
At the same time, the tighter than necessary monetary policy imposes further disinflation 
through wage moderation on DE. The very small differences in inflation that existed at the 
start of EMU thus have become more pronounced in the second round (rising asset prices 
fuelled inflation in RE, externally imposed disinflation further reduced export prices in DE) 
and  the  perverse  pro-cyclical  effects  gain  in  strength,  pushing  inflation  rates  and 
competitiveness of DE and RE on sharply diverging paths. 
Finally,  the  differences  in  wage  setting  between  DE  and  RE  play  a  crucial  role  in  this 
process. Not only did different wage-setting systems put DE and RE on different tracks from 
the  start;  in  addition  the  ability  of  DE  to  counter  inflationary  pressures  through  wage 
coordination around more slowly growing unit labour costs is almost perfectly mirrored by the 
inability of RE to do so. Since inflation is more of a problem in RE (though hidden under the 
beneficial effects of very low real interest rates), the lack of capacity to disinflate implies that 
RE slowly but steadily loses competitiveness relative to RE. In itself that does not have to be 
deeply problematic: if RE can grow through trade outside EMU, it can compensate its falling 
competitiveness  within  EMU  through  rising  competitiveness  outside  EMU.  But  EMU  is 
essentially  a  closed  trade  area,  with  only  about  ten  per  cent  of  GDP  leaving  the  single 
currency zone, most of which goes to other EU member states. Within such a closed trade 
bloc which, in addition, has faced a relatively low growth regime since its inception, DE‘s 
rising competitiveness must imply RE‘s falling competitiveness. Trade in EMU has, in effect, 
become  a  zero-sum  game  in  which  one‘s  gains  are  another  one‘s  losses,  and  DE‘s 
improving  competitiveness  and  current  account  surplus  are  mirrored  in  current  account 
deficits in RE. 
What  follows  traces  the  design  and  the  emergence  of  this  system  back  to  the  start  of 
monetary  integration  in  Europe,  the  construction  of  the  Deutschmark-bloc  within  the 
European Monetary System. It then continues with the generalization of the model to the rest 
of Europe through the Maastricht process in the 1990s. At the start of EMU, the political 
economy of the prospective euro-zone member states was, in effect, a robust disinflationary 
system, calibrated by the interaction between strong wage setters and central banks. The 
introduction of the Euro changed all that by transferring monetary policy to a single central 
bank without a parallel centralization of wage setting and fiscal policy. The outcome was a 
dramatic divergence of inflation rates and competitiveness. 
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III.   Labour markets and monetary integration in Europe: a 
drama in three acts 
The key point of this paper is that the crisis of the Euro in 2010-11 has to be understood 
against the longer-term history of monetary integration in Europe, and most importantly, the 
interaction between that process and the evolution of domestic wage-setting systems. Let us 
start with giving credit where it is due: older theories of optimal currency areas were probably 
right  in  their  broad  implications  that  adjustment  in  a  single  currency  area  without  fiscal 
federalism  or  fiscal  discretion  takes  place  through  labour  markets;  they  were  wrong, 
however, in the substantive policies that this entailed. Put simply, the first steps of monetary 
integration–before, it is important to point out, the introduction of a single monetary policy–
forced individual member states to reorganize  their  domestic macro-economies and their 
wage-setting systems in particular. Yet, and this where optimal currency area theories were 
wrong, this did not entail more labour market flexibility, but more central coordination (and 
therefore  more  organized  labour  markets,  with  strong  trade  unions  and  employers 
associations). Monetary integration, from the Deutschmark-bloc in the early  1980s to the 
institution of EMU, produced its best results in terms of economic performance when labour 
markets evolved into more rather than less centrally organized arrangements. In Europe, as 
the  balance  of  this  paper  will  analyse,  this  process  took  place  in  three  stages:  the 
construction  of  the  DM-bloc  at  the  core  of  the  EMS,  the  Maastricht  process  and  the 
emergence of social pacts in response to the convergence criteria, and the period after the 
introduction of the Euro in 1999, which installed the ECB at the helm of monetary policy. 
 
III.1   Act I: The construction of the Deutschmark bloc 
In the first half of the 1980s, several countries in north-western Europe, including France, 
embarked  on  deeper  monetary  integration.  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  France  and  the 
Netherlands pegged their currencies to the Deutschmark (DM), thus importing the credibility 
of the  Bundesbank in fighting inflation. This monetary anchoring  was not  without  a cost, 
however.  Aligning  inflation  and  interest  rates  required  disciplining  labour  unions:  wage 
growth had to become non-inflationary, since upward price/wage pressures forced national 
central  banks  to  raise  interest  rates  in  order  to  maintain  the  exchange  rate  peg.  More 
importantly,  it  required  that  wages  in  the  sheltered  sector,  primarily  in  the  public  sector, 
followed wage developments in the exposed (primarily manufacturing) sector, where external 
competitiveness was a strong disinflationary anchor. 
Governments,  supported  by  conservative  central  banks,  played  a  critical  role  in  this 
alignment of wages during this period. Central banks were, in effect, last movers in this set-
up, always in a position to punish wage settlements that threaten monetary stability. The 
exposed sector, consisting mainly  of the manufacturing export sector, however, does  not 14 — Hancké / Worlds Apart? — I H S  
 
require  such  a  back-stop  function  by  the  central  bank,  since  it  faces  a  market-imposed 
competitiveness  constraint  on  wage  setting  as  a  result  of  economic  integration.  The 
sheltered  sector,  and  the  public  sector  in  particular,  by  definition  do  not  face  such  a 
constraint.  The  wage  restraint  policies  imposed  by  central  banks  and  governments  thus 
targeted the sheltered sector, specifically wages in the highly unionized public sector, and 
forced it to follow wage rates adopted by the exposed sector. Not surprisingly, imposing such 
constraints against the will of strong labour unions was far from easy. 
All countries aspiring to DM-bloc membership in the early 1980s faced a period of protracted 
social  conflict  when  governments  pegged  currencies  to  the  DM  and  thus  were  forced  to 
contain  wage  growth  and  public  spending  as  a  result.  Both  the  number  of  strikes  and 
working  days  lost  to  strikes,  in  the  public  sector  in  particular,  increased  suddenly  and 
significantly in the years leading up to the formal peg between the domestic currency and the 
DM. Belgium and the Netherlands faced a massive public sector strike in the autumn of 
1983, which paralysed large parts of the countries for several weeks. The strikes ultimately 
ended in defeat for the public sector unions, and led to the institutionalized subordination of 
wages in the public sector to those in the private exporting sector. In Denmark the number of 
working  days  lost  through  strikes  jumped  a  massive  500%  from  about  160  strikes  on 
average in 1982, 1983 and 1984 to 820 in 1985, while working days lost to strikes increased 
from  about  100,000  on  average  before  1985  to  over  2  Million  in  that  year  (source:  ILO 
Labour  Statistics).  In  France  the  high-strike  years  1983-1985,  immediately  following  the 
Mitterrand U-turn on economic policy, the Franc-DM peg, and the forced disinflation after 
1982 (Taddéi & Coriat 1993), heralded the shift toward a regime where labour was, in effect, 
sidelined  on  the  political-economic  scene.  Between  1980  and  1985,  Belgium,  Denmark, 
France and the Netherlands combined passed no fewer than thirteen laws that aimed at 
containing wage growth in the public sector, with the effect that average annual real wage 
growth for the 1980s in Belgium was 0%, negative in the Netherlands, and below 2% in 
Denmark, after a decade during which these were, for the same countries, 7.5% (BE), 5.5% 
(NL), and 5.4% (DK) (Johnston 2011: 80-81). More, therefore, than keeping strong unions in 
the  private  (exporting)  sector  under  control,  government  and  central  bank  policies  were 
aimed at reducing the wage margins of the public sector. 
The outcome of this period of social conflict was a tightly organized system in which national 
central banks of the DM-bloc members were hierarchically linked to the Bundesbank, labour 
unions (and wages) in the exposed sector hierarchically linked to German wage setting, and 
public sector wages in each country hierarchically linked to exposed sector wages. The first 
of these linkages assured the credibility of the peg: national central banks made clear to 
domestic audiences that they would defend the currency, even if that entailed raising interest 
rates to a prohibitively high level. The second linkage, between the key German trade unions 
and their counterparts elsewhere, assured that the German set-up with a strong conservative 
central bank that disciplined excessive wages was transmitted to all other countries in the 
currency  bloc.  Wages  outside  Germany  thus  were  kept  under  control  through  two I H S — Hancké / Worlds Apart? — 15 
mechanisms:  one  was  direct  wage  shadowing,  whereby  wages  outside  Germany  grew, 
adjusting for labour productivity, at a similar rate as German wages; the other was provided 
by  credible  conservative  monetary  policies  as  the  back  stop  in  case  of  excessive  wage 
settlements. 
 
III.2   Act II: Adjusting to Maastricht 
This set-up became the template for future monetary integration. When the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1991, mapping the road to EMU, was negotiated, average inflation differentials between 
the DM-bloc and the other economies in the EMS (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) were 
about nine per cent (all inflation data are taken from the OECD Employment Outlook 2002). 
By the late 1990s, a few months before the introduction of the Euro, inflation rates across the 
prospective Euro-zone had converged on an average slightly above one per cent, with a 
differential between the DM and non-DM countries of just one per cent and, per Maastricht 
criteria, none more than one and a half per cent above the best performers. 
The importance of inflation in this reasoning is that it is, despite the formal multiple targets in 
the Maastricht Treaty, the key variable for meeting the convergence criteria: stable domestic 
prices not only were a target in themselves, but they also stabilized both the currency peg 
and the interest rate against the key target rates embodied in the Treaty. Long-term interest 
rates thus fell, both as a result of the exchange rate peg and through imported credibility, 
which  alleviated  budgetary  pressures  in  turn. Whatever  other  conditions  may  have  been 
necessary, keeping domestic inflation under control was vital for a country‘s entry into EMU. 
Governments,  assisted  by  central  banks,  again  played  a  crucial  role  in  this  process.  In 
essence, an implicit deal was proposed everywhere along the following terms: if the social 
partners  agreed  to  keep  wage  growth  under  control  and  refrained  from  raising  prices, 
governments would support those disinflationary moves by co-opting labour market parties in 
major welfare, labour market and budgetary reforms, while central banks would keep interest 
rates as low as possible; if social partners failed, however, determined governments and 
central banks would reduce inflation nonetheless, almost certainly with higher social costs 
(and possibly higher political costs for governments, but these would have to be weighed 
against  the  political  costs  of  non-EMU  membership).  In  a  subtler,  and  definitely  more 
cooperative  form,  therefore,  these  post-Maastricht  arrangements  thus  replicated  the 
government policies and institutions of the prospective DM-bloc countries almost a decade 
earlier (Fajertag & Pochet 1997). 
But social partners in these countries were not necessarily able to deliver low wage inflation 
very  easily.  Southern  Europe  has  a  long  history,  in  fact,  of  failed  attempts  at  instituting 
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steer  the  economy,  usually  associated  with  competition  between  ideologically  opposed 
labour union confederations, low union density, or the organizational inability of federations 
to control lower-level labour unions (see, for example, Rhodes & Molina 2007). In the past, 
the state stepped in to compensate for this lack of organization on the labour side, with a 
comparatively heavy hand in labour law and employment relations, and the same happened 
during the Maastricht adjustment process in the 1990s. The implicit deal sketched above 
was sanctioned  in social  pacts: governments offered consultation and  negotiation on the 
means for wage and fiscal restraint if social partners agreed on the broad targets (which 
themselves followed the Maastricht Treaty: low and stable inflation, a stable exchange rate, a 
low and stable interest rate, and fiscal consolidation with a deficit level of 3% and a debt 
level of 60% of GDP). Even the countries where the past caught up with the social partners 
and government and where a social pact turned out to be impossible to reach, ended up 
negotiating an incomes policy, either stand-alone or as part of a broader deal, which kept 
wage inflation in check and engendered all the beneficial effects that follow (Pochet 2002; 
Hancké & Rhodes 2005).  
One small irony should not go unappreciated here: the highly organized northern economies, 
often held up as shining examples of tri-partite or bi-partite neo-corporatism, transitioned into 
the monetarist macro-economic model underlying the DM-bloc through major social conflicts. 
The  southern  EMU  member-states,  on  the  other  hand,  often  considered  ‗ungovernable‘ 
because  of  their  highly  ideological  labour  unions  and  adversarial  employment  relations 
systems, adopted a considerably more conciliatory approach. With governments and central 
banks as the drivers of monetary regime change, organized labour in the south appeared to 
have accepted the new policy regime as a fait accompli and worked within the margins that 
this regime offered.  
The effects of these reorganizations of the macro-economic policy framework everywhere, 
but especially in the south, have been nothing short of spectacular. All the major Maastricht 
convergence criteria were easily reached, and all applying EU member-states safe Greece 
‗irrevocably‘ fixed their exchange rate to the new single currency in 1999 (Greece joined in 
2001). EMU was born. 
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III.3   Act III: Labour unions, wages and the ECB 
The introduction of the Euro in 1999 set the stage for the third and final act of the drama. 
Most citizens of EMU member-states associate the Euro with ease of travel, companies in 
the euro-zone associate it with exchange rate stability and price transparency, and financial 
markets  with  a  credible  low  inflation  regime.  These  aspects  of  the  Euro  are  certainly 
important;  its  essence  for  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  however,  lies  elsewhere.  The 
introduction of the single currency dramatically changed the institutional framework of macro-
economic policy, both within and between countries. First of all, it produced a pro-cyclical 
monetary regime. The single nominal interest rate, reflecting the ECB‘s two per cent inflation 
rate  target,  translated  into  excessively  accommodating  real  interest  rates  (the  nominal 
interest rate minus the actual inflation rate) in countries with inflation above the two percent, 
and  excessively  tight monetary  policy in countries  with  a low  inflation rate. That fed into 
higher growth and higher inflation in the first group and lower growth in the second group, 
thus  pushing  both  groups  of  countries  in  opposite  directions:  inflation  rose  in  the  high-
inflation group in the first period and fell in the low-inflation group–thus fuelling asset price 
inflation in the first and stifling growth in the second group of countries. 
These perverse effects could easily be off-set through fiscal policy. But two considerations 
make that a less appetizing choice than it would seem. Governments are on the whole loath 
to impose taxes, especially in times of fiscal surplus: fiscal tightening to counter monetary 
relaxation is thus very hard to implement. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), in addition, 
makes  annual  deficits  above  three  per  cent  of  GDP  problematic:  that  raises  the  bar  for 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy in a tight monetary regime. (The SGP, in fact, operates in a 
moderately pro-cyclical fashion as well, by rewarding countries with a surplus and punishing 
countries  with  a  deficit,  thus  exacerbating  the  problems  that  pro-cyclical  monetary  policy 
produces.)  
Against  the  background  of  this  shift  in  the  international  regime  toward  a  pro-cyclical 
monetary  policy,  domestic  wage-setting  regimes  witnessed  an  important  but 
underappreciated structural shift. EMU transferred stewardship of the economy from national 
central banks, with all the power they held over wage setters and governments, to a single 
ECB, with the implicit perverse effect that the domestic pressure, exercised by the central 
bank, on wage setters in EMU member-states effectively disappeared. Many observers in 
the late 1990s predicted a massive inflationary scramble as a result: since the ECB is unable 
to retaliate against one union in one country—in contrast to how national central banks had 
increasingly threatened tightening during the previous two decades—excessive wage rates 
could no longer easily be punished (Iversen & Soskice 2001; Hall & Franzese 1998). To take 
an example: in the limiting case even the German engineering union IG Metall, the leader in 
most wage settlements in the country and one of the largest and strongest trade unions in 
the  world), saw its  weight in the central bank‘s reaction function diminish from nominally 
about  thirty  per  cent  for  the  Bundesbank  (but  in  real  terms  almost  certainly  much  more 18 — Hancké / Worlds Apart? — I H S  
 
because of the union‘s pilot function for wages throughout Germany) to (again nominally) 
about ten per cent for the ECB: engineering accounts for roughly one-third of German GDP, 
and Germany for roughly one-third of Euro-zone GDP. Since every labour union in every 
country  finds  itself  in  a  parallel  position,  all  have  an  incentive  to  exploit  their  new-found 
freedom: a classic collective action problem that produces wage inflation everywhere–thus 
the argument. 
The first ten years of EMU demonstrate rather convincingly that this is not what happened. 
While wage inflation rates diverged between member states, EMU‘s aggregate inflation rate 
remained low throughout the first decade, usually hovering between two and three per cent. 
Wage growth was, on the whole, moderate, and there were very few signs of the inflationary 
scramble that many observers feared. The introduction of the single currency  did reveal, 
however,  that  wage  setting  in  the  member  states  were  aggregations  of  two  increasingly 
divergent  trajectories:  the  exposed  sector‘s  path,  on  the  one  hand,  where  markets  had 
sufficient  power  to  contain  excessive  wage  demands,  and  the  sheltered  sector‘s,  on  the 
other, where international competition (and in the case of the public sector any competition 
whatsoever) which restrains wage growth was absent. All other things equal, wage inflation 
was unlikely in the former, lest the export sector began to price itself out of the market and 
workers therefore out of a job,  while  it  was, for the mirror reason of job stability,  almost 
certain to emerge in the latter. The institution of EMU thus, somewhat perversely, reopened a 
cleavage within the labour unions that had been closed in the previous decades (Johnston 
2012).  
Yet, things were not wholly equal across EMU‘s member-states: in north- western Europe, 
wage coordination across different sectors constrained the public sector in its wage setting–
mostly because shadowing wage rates in the leading manufacturing sector possibly secured 
the best medium-term wage deal for the public sector, but often also because of coercion, as 
in Austria and Belgium, where institutional and legal constraints, such as labour law, budget 
rules (Hodson 2011: ch. 5) or organizational power within the union confederation, imposed 
a  hard  ceiling  on  public  sector  wages  (Johnston  &  Hancké  2009;  Johnston  2012).  In 
countries  where  the  exporting  manufacturing  sector  was  not  the  leading  trade  union, 
however, and/or where public sector unions were capable of extricating themselves from the 
wage-setting  system  that  revolved  around  the  leading  export-sector  unions,  wages 
(expressed in ULC) in the public and in the manufacturing export sector diverged rapidly. 
This was the case in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece for much of the first decade 
of EMU up until the crisis of 2008. Since domestic wage inflation is, in effect, the weighted 
average of sheltered (including, and possibly dominated by, public) sector wage inflation and 
exposed (manufacturing and other export) sector wage inflation, inflationary pressures thus 
started to rise in these countries.  
Rising wage inflation in the public sector is, in principle, relatively easy to compensate in the 
exposed (export) sector, as long as the productivity rate of the latter is high enough–which it I H S — Hancké / Worlds Apart? — 19 
is in much of the key manufacturing sectors–and wages grow at a moderate enough rate. 
But in some cases the export sector may have only a low potential to compensate, because 
it consists primarily of relatively low value-added sub-sectors, because the export sector is 
too small compared to the sheltered sector, or the export sector might simply set its own 
wages above productivity regardless of the consequences, thus exacerbating the inflationary 
pressures  emanating  from  the  sheltered  private  and  public  sectors.  Under  those 
circumstances,  the  ability  to  compensate  for  high  wage  inflation  in  the  sheltered  (public) 
sector is drastically limited, aggregate domestic wage inflation rises faster and higher, and 
the competitiveness of the export sector falls rapidly as a result  of what is,  in effect, an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. That was also exactly what we witnessed in the EMU 
economies that faced important public debt problems in the 2010-11. Before the introduction 
of the Euro in 1999, manufacturing wages and public sector wages roughly followed the 
same pattern in all prospective member states. From 1999 onwards, however, the evolution 
of the two diverged sharply: manufacturing  wages across the euro-zone remained tightly 
controlled (expressed in unit labour cost terms, they were negative, in fact, as Johnston 2012 
demonstrates), while public sector wages were on an upward trajectory until 2007.  
This potentially explosive reconfiguration of relations between the sheltered and the exposed 
sectors took place against the background of the newly instituted centralized monetary policy 
in EMU. The ECB‘s single interest rate, which reflects the distance from the central bank‘s 
asymmetric inflation target of two per cent, has had very different consequences for different 
regions within EMU–which is what the member states in the single currency area effectively 
have become. Somewhat ironically, therefore, by implicitly rewarding high-inflation countries 
with a lower real interest rate, the ECB ended up de facto also sanctioning excessive wage 
claims by the public sector.  
Two inadvertent consequences of EMU thus interacted to produce the dramatic outcomes 
we  saw  in  the  late  2000s  and  after.  One  of  these  is  related  to  the  structure  of  wage 
bargaining: the introduction of the ECB lifted the restraints by central banks on wage-setting 
in the public sector in each of the member states. If wage coordination remained successful 
in the absence of a tough reaction by the central bank, wages in the public sector remained 
contained;  if  not,  a  dramatic  divergence  of  wages  (expressed  in  ULC  terms)  followed, 
inflation rose, and export competitiveness fell. The second relates to the pro-cyclical effects 
of a single monetary policy: EMU‘s single interest rate means that low-inflation countries 
have a higher real interest rate than high-inflation countries, thus fuelling inflation in the latter 
and  thereby  exacerbating  the  structural  competitiveness  problems.  Fiscal  policy  appears 
unable to alleviate these pro-cyclical effects, and even the accompanying counter-cyclical 
evolution  of  the  real  exchange  rate  (which  falls  in  low-inflation  and  rises  in  high-inflation 
countries, thus improving competitiveness in the first) compensates but far from totally, since 
it only  applies to the  export sector. In fact, this divergence of relative competitiveness is 
actually part of the problem: it feeds in to the dramatic current account imbalances across 
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IV.   Conclusion 
At the time of writing this paper, in late 2011, many new initiatives have been floated to save 
the Euro. All of these, however, remain informed by the need for fiscal restraint and very little 
is done to deal with the structural current account imbalances that were identified here as 
being  at  the  heart  of  the  problem.  The  plan,  proposed  by  France  and  Germany  and 
discussed at the summit on 8 and 9 December, calls for an intrusive ‗fiscal union‘, in which 
governments that run sustained fiscal deficits will be held to account. Perhaps this initiative 
will, in a more expansive version, be complemented by Euro-bonds, possibly underwritten by 
the ECB. If all goes well, such an arrangement will alleviate the immediate pressures on the 
Euro-zone. 
However, if the analysis in this paper has any traction, the new governance arrangements of 
EMU will not address the underlying structural problems of EMU, which are related to the 
sharp  divergence  of  competitiveness  between  the  two  blocks  of  economies  against  the 
background  of  a  one-size-fits-all  monetary  policy.  Because  of  the  demise  of  the  nested 
arrangement that preceded EMU, in which central banks held wages in both the exposed 
and  sheltered  sectors  in  check,  EMU  has  become  a  monetary  union  that  invites  these 
imbalances. And it is hard to see how these can be addressed. The southern GIPS and 
Ireland would have to increase their exports in absolute and relative terms significantly by 
producing and exporting more high value-added goods and services, while Germany and its 
neighbours would have to reorient their domestic economies away from exports into private 
and public consumption. Easy to imagine on paper but nigh impossible in practice–and the 
new EMU governance arrangements are not helping. 
One could imagine Italy and Spain, and possibly Ireland once it finds itself on its feet again, 
to slowly sort out their competitiveness issues–even though that would probably take at least 
a decade or more of economic growth in the euro-zone, something which itself will take a 
long  time  to  materialize  in  today‘s  austerity-driven  political-economic  climate,  and  the 
construction  of  domestic  institutional  arrangements  to  underpin  these  shifts  in 
competitiveness. It is much harder to imagine Greece and Portugal to do so, though, since 
none of these countries have a competitive manufacturing or even modern sector to speak of 
on which they could build this adjustment strategy. In addition, all of them lack domestic 
institutions  such  as  well-developed  training  systems,  strong  trade  unions  and  employers 
associations,  coordinated  wage  bargaining  institutions  and  cooperative  workplace  labour 
relations that would allow them to make a move up-market in their export profiles, and it is 
not immediately obvious if and how  they could build them. Italy may have succeeded  in 
reorganizing its political economy under the aegis of the 1993 social pact (Herrmann 2005), 
which suggests that it is possible–but the considerably more modest results in the fields of 
labour relations, workplace and supplier upgrading in France during the 1980s (Levy 1999) 
suggest that this success is far from a foregone conclusion. While these countries are busy I H S — Hancké / Worlds Apart? — 21 
sorting out their domestic economies, then, Germany and its neighbours would have to be 
persuaded to do something that they seem to think of as shooting themselves in the foot: 
develop wage and government policies that lower competitiveness, and rely on domestic 
consumption as an engine of growth for the first time since World War II. In all, this is a tall 
order for EMU, even if all countries agreed on these steps. Sadly, they do not. 
The upshot of this analysis is therefore clear: EMU is structurally in trouble unless it develops 
two mechanisms that alleviate the imbalances that have grown in the past decade. The first 
is a mechanism that counteracts excessive inflation divergence when it emerges: a proper 
fiscal union, with transfer mechanisms through which fast-growing countries contribute more 
to a central pool than slow-growing ones–Greece, Ireland and Spain in the past, Germany 
and north-west Europe today–would produce that. This would moderate growth and inflation 
somewhat in the fast-growing countries and compensate for the ECB-imposed deflation in 
the slow-growing countries and thus mitigate the current account divergences. The second is 
that Germany and its neighbours have to rethink their domestic economies away from the 
massive reliance on exports to the rest of EMU, and adopt more classical Keynesian policies 
geared toward domestic demand–at the risk, yes, of higher inflation, which both the ECB and 
Germany will have to take on the chin. In short, EMU needs a bottom-up redesign if it is to 
survive. The rest, including what we saw in Brussels in December 2011, is tinkering in the 
margins. 
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